



## RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD ORDER

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### **Abstract**

*The Russia-Ukraine war began on February 24, 2022, and has brought about significant changes in the concept of global security, challenging the contemporary multipolar world order. It has raised various debates and ideas on military alliances, nuclear deterrence and territorial sovereignty. The Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated that global institutions have not shown solutions to resolve the crisis. Furthermore, it has exposed the limitations of global security frameworks in stopping prolonged interstate wars. The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the solidarity among Western countries and their allies have led to a shift in military strategy. Similarly, non-Western countries, such as India and China, have developed a cautious and balanced approach and diplomacy to deal with the Russia-Ukraine war. The global energy crisis has impacted supply chains, and food security issues have exacerbated concerns about regional stability in the Global South. Further, the Russia-Ukraine war has created new diplomatic strategies to deal with the information of warfare, cybersecurity, and the weaponisation of economic tools. The Russia-Ukraine war has significantly impacted international human rights norms, global governance mechanisms, and the proliferation of security pacts in the multipolar world order. Traditional concepts, i.e. security and power, have been redefined. Multilateral approaches are designed to resolve conflicts and global crises. The Russia-Ukraine war has played a pivotal role in shaping the contemporary world order and developing global security architectures in the 21st century.*

**Key Words:** *Multipolarity, Russia-Ukraine War, NATO, Contemporary World Order and Global Security.*

### **Introduction**

The unleashing of the Russia-Ukraine war commenced on February 24, 2022, with a full-scale attack by Russia. It has become a critical point in the geopolitics of the 21st century. It has witnessed the traditional conflict since World War II. The Russia-Ukraine war conflict has taught a lesson for the global security framework. Post-Cold War politics were represented by the emergence of active multilateral institutions, the liberal international order and the decline of conventional warfare methods. The Ukraine conflict has led to a militarised conflict and great power competition. It has raised questions about various global institutions, such as the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, as well as security alliances, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Further, it has raised questions about globalisation and economic institutions.

The Russia-Ukraine war has brought about significant changes in the global security framework, with special reference to food security, the emergence of rivalries on various continents, high-level allocation of defence expenditures, and revisions to alliances and arms control regimes. The refugee crisis has spread globally from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region. The whole global world has been extensively affected by the Russia-Ukraine war. Various challenges have emerged out of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, i.e. cyber warfare, disinformation tactics, and nuclear escalation, which have witnessed the critical momentum in the contemporary multipolar world order. The Russia-Ukraine war



has a multifaceted impact. It has brought about dynamic changes in the traditional and non-traditional security dimensions, with repercussions for global governance, the normative foundations of the worldwide order, and stability. Russia - The Russia-Ukraine war has reshaped the geopolitical structure in the 21st century.

## **Historical Background and Origin of the Russia-Ukraine War**

The beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war had deep roots in ideological divergence, intertwined history, geopolitical rivalry, and imperial domination. Understanding and critically examining Ukraine's complex relationship with Russia, its post-Soviet transition, and its association with Western institutions is essential.

### **Kievan Rus' and Early Historical Ties**

The historical roots between Russia and Ukraine date back to the Kievan Rus, a medieval East Slavic state centred in the present-day capital of Ukraine, Kyiv. Kyiv has been identified as an epicentre of the cultural and political developments during Soviet Russia (Plokyh, 2015). Russian nationalists have described those two countries as having strong historical unity and cultural connections. Ukrainian scholars have different perspectives on national identity and political developments.

### **Soviet Era and Forced Integration**

The Soviet Union forcibly annexed Ukraine in 1922 following the Bolshevik Revolution and the suppression of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The political repression has witnessed the Soviet period, intense repressions and the very oppressive policies of the Holodomor famine of 1932–33, which killed millions of Ukrainians (Applebaum, 2017). These factors led to deep mistrust, a key factor in Ukrainian nationalism.

### **Independence and the Post-Soviet Transition**

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a pivotal moment in global politics. Ukraine declared its independence and has undergone various phases in its transition to a market economy and democracy. Ukraine has cordial relations with Russia since the beginning. Later on, the tensions have erupted over the division of the Black Sea fleet, usage of the Russian language in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea (D'Anieri, 2019). Afterwards, Ukraine developed its proximity to the Euro-Atlantic structures and extended its intention to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU). These developments have eventually provoked Russia to launch a full-scale offensive war.

### **The 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014 Euromaidan Protests**

The internal political struggles in Ukraine have caught the attention of global actors. The 2004 Orange Revolution was marked by electoral fraud and was analysed as a victory for Western forces. After 10 years, the 2014 Euromaidan movement began following the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovich. Under Russian pressure, the Ukrainian political leadership rejected the EU association agreement. High-level mass protests have led to the ousting of Yanukovich. Thus, Russia has seen these developments as a Western-backed coup and a potential threat to the influence of Russia in Ukraine (Wilson, 2014).

### **2014 Annexation of Crimea and the Donbas Conflict**

Since Ukraine has changed its political orientation, Russia has annexed Crimea in March 2014. Russia has given the justification for annexing Crimea on the account of protecting the interests of the



Russian-speaking population, the naval base at Sevastopol and the strategic interests. Since it has become a disputed referendum, Russia has annexed the Crimea. The global community has vehemently condemned Russia's action and also for violating the international law and sovereignty of Ukraine (Charap & Colton, 2017). Meanwhile, pro-Russian separatists, supported by the Moscow authority, have started armed insurgency and attacks in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Eastern Ukraine, which has eventually resulted in a protracted conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **The Minsk Agreements and Diplomatic Failures**

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has brokered two agreements, Minsk I (2014) and Minsk II (2015), to stop the violence in eastern Ukraine. These two frameworks have not been successful in addressing various factors, including prolonged military attacks on the regions of Ukraine, mutual distrust, and divergence in the interpretation of the issue (Kudelia, 2016). Diplomatic failures and unsuccessful negotiation methods have led to enduring conflicts in the region. In this context, Russia has continued its political and military control over the separatist territories.

### **The 2022 Full-Scale Invasion**

Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, has described it as a special military operation to demilitarise and de-Nazify Ukraine. Ukraine has shown its inclination to become a member of NATO and has persecuted the speakers of the Russian language (Putin, 2022). Global analysts have attributed these allegations to be the main reason for Russia's war against Ukraine. The Russia-Ukraine war has witnessed the high-level mobilisation of troops since World War II and has redefined the landscape of European security.

### **Important Phases of the Russia-Ukraine War (2022–2025)**

The Russia-Ukraine war, which commenced in February 2022, has turned into one of the most protracted conflicts in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It has brought about dynamic changes in global politics, revived NATO, tested Western actions, and ultimately altered the security landscape of Eastern Europe. The origin of the Russia-Ukraine conflict has its roots in the annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 2014. Russia declared full-scale war in February 2022 against Ukraine. Thus, it will provide a critical elucidation of the important phases of the war from 2022 to 2025. Further, it will critically examine the political developments, latest trends in the military operations, and global responses to the Russia-Ukraine war.

### **Phase I: The Full-Scale Invasion and Initial Resistance (February – April 2022)**

The Russia-Ukraine war has reached its pinnacle when Russia has declared a full-scale invasion of Ukraine with 1,50,000 military troops at various key strategic fronts of Ukraine (Kofman & Lee, 2022). Russia's initial objective was to overthrow Zelensky's government by occupying Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. Ukraine's military forces have resisted the high-level military bombardments by the Russian military forces. Military forces stationed in urban cities, such as Kyiv, Mariupol, and Kharkiv, have also resisted the Russian military's advancement. Western-based military weapons and intelligence systems, i.e. Bayraktar drones and Javelin anti-tank missiles, have disrupted the Russian supply lines and caused heavy damage (Gibbons-Neff et al., 2022). Due to these developments, Russia is expected to retreat from Northern Ukraine and Kyiv by early 2022, driven by various strategic factors. Mass burial grounds at Irpin and Bucha have led to the global condemnation of the Russian military action in Ukraine (UN Human Rights Council, 2022).



## **Phase II: Russian Realignment and Ukrainian Counteroffensives (May – December 2022)**

Russia has shifted its attention to the southern and eastern Ukraine with special reference to the land corridor to Crimea and the Donbas region. High-level military battles took place in Mariupol, Severodonetsk, and Lysychansk. Russian military forces occupied Mariupol by May 2022. Afterwards, Ukraine relaunched counteroffensive strategies by the summer of 2022. Ukraine's forces have shown military aggressiveness in the Kharkiv region. Thus, Ukraine regained control of the 8000 kilometres within days (ISW, 2022). It has witnessed the strength of Ukraine's military capabilities and the logistical challenges faced by the Russian military forces. Ukraine regained control of Kherson city in November 2022. Russia had previously captured the Kherson region at the beginning of the war. Regaining control over the Kherson region by Ukraine has bolstered Ukraine's military capabilities (BBC, 2022). Thus, Russia has developed its control over the occupied territory. Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced the annexation of the Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Kherson and Luhansk regions. (TASS, 2022).

## **Phase III: Stalemate and Attrition Warfare (2023)**

2023 has witnessed territorial changes and attritional warfare. Ukraine and Russia have lost significant amounts of military equipment and soldiers. Frontline troops have been deployed along the eastern side of Donbas and the south bank of the Dnipro River. Russia launched aggressive aerial strikes on Bakhmut and Soledar in May 2023 (Al Jazeera, 2023). Russia has spent a considerable amount of money on these attacks, but it has not achieved the expected targets. Ukraine has achieved limited gains in the summer counteroffensive warfare in 2023. Despite the extensive help of Western countries, modern equipment of NATO, HIMARS rocket systems and Leopard 2 tanks, Russian forces have defeated the Ukrainian military forces. Russia has significantly gained advantages in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions (Sabbagh, 2023). Since neither side has achieved significant milestones in these conflicts, scholars have described it as a war of attrition. Russia's armed forces and drones have targeted the energy grid of Ukraine and infrastructure, resulting in blackouts during the winter months in Ukraine (ICRC, 2023).

## **Phase IV: Cross-Border Strikes and Internal Political Shifts (2024)**

The Russia-Ukraine war is expected to expand in political and geographical scope by 2024. Ukraine has increased its offensive war techniques and cross-border operations into Russian territory, and also attacked fuel facilities and military depots in the Bryansk Oblast and Belgorod and Kursk regions. These attacks are symbolic, but these strikes have indicated a strong message that Ukraine could enter the territory of Russia, and the military capabilities of Ukraine, also bringing war home to Russia (Washington Post, 2024). These developments have triggered domestic unrest in Russia, particularly in the political sphere. This has further resulted in high casualties and a stagnant economy. Military recruitment has decreased, and confidence levels among Russian soldiers are very low. However, the Kremlin administration has taken stringent measures to control civil society and the media.

At the global level, the EU and the United States have extended support to Ukraine. Extensive debates took place in Western capitals about the long-term military aid. - The Ukraine war became very prominent in the US Presidential elections in 2024. American citizens have questioned the US administration for its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war. In a significant development, Russia took the position of Avdiivka, consolidating its military control over the Donetsk region. Ukraine has successfully protected its Kupiansk and launched drone strikes on the Russian naval bases and assets in Sevastopol, Russia.



### **Phase V: Escalating Diplomacy and Strategic Reassessments (2025)**

Several developments have occurred, including diplomatic efforts in 2025, driven by various political developments. U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff met Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg. It has indicated dynamic shifts and changes in diplomatic engagements between the United States and Russia since the Ukraine war began (Reuters, 2025). The USA has proposed a peace plan that has greatly benefited Russia. It includes Russia's control over Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. European countries and Ukraine have extensively discussed the repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war. (New York Post, 2025). Ukrainian President Zelensky has stated that territorial changes will not be acceptable to Ukraine.

Furthermore, European countries have extended military support of €21 billion to the Ukrainian army to enhance its ammunition and air defence capabilities. Poland, Finland, and Germany have focused on enhancing their military capabilities to counter Russia's offensive warfare methods in the summer of 2025 (AP News, 2025). Intensified battles have begun at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and in eastern Ukraine. Various scholars have analysed that war has entered a frozen conflict stage. It will culminate in a reduction of the conflict's intensity, but no peace treaty has been signed. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has undergone distinct episodes marked by the intensification of strategic war policies and the evolution of the global order. In the beginning phase of the war, Russia was aiming to dominate Ukraine, but unfortunately, it has turned into a protracted war conflict. The resistance, geopolitical realignments, and attrition have all contributed to the evolution of this conflict. The war period from 2022 to 2025 has demonstrated Russia's military prowess, the resilience of the Ukrainian state, and the limitations of conventional military capabilities in the contemporary world order. It will have a profound impact and implications for global security and Europe.

### **The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on Global Security in the Contemporary World Order**

The Russia-Ukraine war began with a full-scale offensive invasion by Russia on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which has witnessed the most significant armed conflict in Europe. It is one of the largest wars since World War II. It has significantly altered the global security landscape in the contemporary multipolar world order. Furthermore, this war has challenged various multilateral institutions, undermined international legal institutions, and intensified great power competition. The Russia-Ukraine war has significantly impacted military alliances and led to a heightened great power rivalry among nations. The Russia-Ukraine war has affected the military alliances, arms proliferation, security of Eastern Europe, and regional stability. The Russia-Ukraine war has witnessed the development of military strategies, energy politics, and the decline of global institutions.

### **Russia's Strategic Miscalculations and Objectives**

Russia had anticipated a high-level military win at the launch of the offensive war against Ukraine. Russia had planned to attack and capture Kyiv and remove the Ukrainian Government. It was based on incorrect intelligence inputs, which underestimated Ukraine's military capabilities and overestimated Russia's military superiority (Galeotti, 2023). Russia has named an offensive military invasion as a special military operation to demilitarise Ukraine and prevent the expansion of NATO. These aspects have been considered as neo-imperial ambitions of Russia (Mearsheimer, 2022). Russia miscalculated the resilience of Ukraine and the response of the West. It has exposed the Kremlin's strategic overreach, swift military victory over Ukraine, and also exposed the major flaws in the Russian military, corruption practices, outdated doctrine and poor logistics. Failures at the beginning level set the stage for a prolonged war and ultimately backfired on Russia's long-term interests.



### Ukraine’s Resistance and Asymmetrical Advantage

Ukraine’s military power and defence strategies have evolved into an asymmetrical warfare under the leadership of Volodymyr Zelensky. Ukraine has utilised Western intelligence assistance to halt Russia's advances. Furthermore, Ukraine has also utilised local resources and military sources. Zelensky's leadership has been characterised by diplomacy and global support (Freedman, 2022). Ukraine has used the latest drone warfare techniques, citizen mobilisation, and decentralised command methods to counter the offensive Russian military prowess. It has led to a high level of infrastructural and human cost. Scores of citizens have been devastated in the Southern and the Ukrainian part of Russia. Ukraine has won diplomatic legitimacy, but a protracted and durable war has created high-level military tension between Russia and Ukraine, which has eventually affected global security.

### Erosion of the Rules-Based International Order

The Russia-Ukraine war has altered the global order established after World War II. Russia’s declaration of *Special Military Operation* on Ukraine is a violation of the United Nations Charter, which has prevented the exercise of military action against the political independence or the territorial integrity of any state. (UN Charter, Article 2.4). It has highlighted the limits of international law for the permanent members of the UN Security Council. The United Nations has not imposed many sanctions on Russia, as Russia holds veto power in the United Nations Security Council. These developments have challenged the role of multilateral institutions in the contemporary world order. (Bosco, 2022). Thus, the Russia-Ukraine war has altered the global order's outlook from a norm-based system to one characterised by spheres of influence and hard power.

### Arms Race and Military Modernisation

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has led to a global arms race and the modernisation of military equipment. Western countries have supplied significant weapons to Ukraine and also extended military aid in the case of the Patriot Missiles, main battle tanks, and HIMARS. All this equipment has strengthened Ukraine's defence capabilities and led to military modernisation in Asia and Europe (International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 2023). Germany also reversed its military policy in the post-World War II era by allocating the defence budget of €100 billion. Japan has allocated a high-level budget to the defence sector in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war (DW, 2023). These developments have indicated a transition from the post-Cold War peace dividend to rearmament as a central feature of national security.

**Table 1: Arms Transfer from the USA to Ukraine from 2022 to 2024**

SIPRI AT Database ID	Supplier	Recipient	Designation	Description	Armament category	Order date	Order date is estimate	Numbers delivered	Numbers delivered is estimate	Delivery year	Delivery year is estimate
65820	United States	Ukraine	MaxxPro	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	440	No	2022	No
68219	United States	Ukraine	Phoenix Ghost Disruptor	one-way attack drone	Missiles	2022	Yes	130	Yes	2023	
68219	United States	Ukraine	Phoenix Ghost Disruptor	one-way attack drone	Missiles	2022	Yes	130	Yes	2024	
65326	United States	Ukraine	FGM-148 Javelin	anti-tank missile	Missiles	2022	No	7700	Yes	2022	No
65326	United States	Ukraine	FGM-148 Javelin	anti-tank missile	Missiles	2022	No	9000	Yes	2024	



65326	United States	Ukraine	FGM-148 Javelin	anti-tank missile	Missiles	2022	No	5300	Yes	2023	No
65901	United States	Ukraine	HMMWV-UA	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	150	Yes	2023	Yes
66221	United States	Ukraine	AIM-120C AMRAAM	long-range air-to-air missile	Missiles	2022	No	75	Yes	2024	
66527	United States	Ukraine	BATT	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2023	No	173	No	2024	
66527	United States	Ukraine	BATT	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2023	No	16	No	2023	No
65657	United States	Ukraine	Excalibur	guided shell	Missiles	2022	No	2300	Yes	2023	No
65657	United States	Ukraine	Excalibur	guided shell	Missiles	2022	No	4700	No	2022	No
66031	United States	Ukraine	MPQ-64 Sentinel	air-search radar	Sensors	2022	No	12	Yes	2024	Yes
66039	United States	Ukraine	K-6 120mm	mortar	Artillery	2022	No	30	Yes	2022	No
66081	United States	Ukraine	vehicle engine 401-600	vehicle engine	Engines	2022	No	39	Yes	2022	No
65399	United States	Ukraine	HMMWV-UA	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	450	Yes	2022	No
65787	United States	Ukraine	AIM-120C AMRAAM	long-range air-to-air missile	Missiles	2022	No	200	Yes	2022	No
65787	United States	Ukraine	AIM-120C AMRAAM	long-range air-to-air missile	Missiles	2022	No	50	Yes	2023	No
65398	United States	Ukraine	M-113A3	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	700	Yes	2024	
65398	United States	Ukraine	M-113A3	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	200	Yes	2023	No
65398	United States	Ukraine	M-113A3	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	300	No	2022	No
65417	United States	Ukraine	Phoenix Ghost Dagger	one-way attack drone	Missiles	2022	No	1500	Yes	2024	Yes
65417	United States	Ukraine	Phoenix Ghost Dagger	one-way attack drone	Missiles	2022	No	1500	Yes	2023	No
65417	United States	Ukraine	Phoenix Ghost Dagger	one-way attack drone	Missiles	2022	No	1000	Yes	2022	No
68251	United States	Ukraine	NASAMS-2	SAM system	Air-defence systems	2022		2		2022	
68252	United States	Ukraine	AIM-120D AMRAAM	long-range air-to-air missile	Missiles	2024	Yes	250	Yes	2024	
68328	United States	Ukraine	vehicle engine 401-600	vehicle engine	Engines	2023	Yes	10		2024	
68347	United States	Ukraine	Phoenix Ghost Dominator	one-way attack drone	Missiles	2022	Yes	130	Yes	2023	
68347	United States	Ukraine	Phoenix Ghost Dominator	one-way attack drone	Missiles	2022	Yes	130	Yes	2024	
68439	United States	Ukraine	M-106A3	self-propelled	Artillery	2023	Yes	12	No	2023	No



				mortar							
68455	United States	Ukraine	AIM-9X	long-range air-to-air missile	Missiles	2024	Yes	250	Yes	2024	
68492	United States	Ukraine	MMR	multi-role radar	Sensors	2024		5	Yes	2024	
68197	United States	Ukraine	V-BAT-128	UAV	Aircraft	2024		2	Yes	2024	
68178	United States	Ukraine	ATACMS-1A	surface-to-surface missile	Missiles	2024		500	Yes	2024	
67711	United States	Ukraine	HIMARS	multiple rocket launcher	Artillery	2024		3		2024	
67423	United States	Ukraine	JDAM-ER	guided glide bomb	Missiles	2023	No	1500	Yes	2023	No
67423	United States	Ukraine	JDAM-ER	guided glide bomb	Missiles	2023	No	1250	Yes	2024	
66458	United States	Ukraine	M-60 AVLB	armoured bridgelayer	Armoured vehicles	2023	No	18	No	2023	No
66219	United States	Ukraine	AIM-7M	long-range air-to-air missile	Missiles	2022	No	400	Yes	2024	
66219	United States	Ukraine	AIM-7M	long-range air-to-air missile	Missiles	2022	No	400	Yes	2023	No
65561	United States	Ukraine	HIMARS	multiple rocket launcher	Artillery	2022	No	19	Yes	2023	
65561	United States	Ukraine	HIMARS	multiple rocket launcher	Artillery	2022	No	20	No	2022	No
59423	United States	Ukraine	Phoenix Ghost Atlas	one-way attack drone	Missiles	2022	Yes	1000	Yes	2024	No
59423	United States	Ukraine	Phoenix Ghost Atlas	one-way attack drone	Missiles	2022	Yes	1000	Yes	2023	Yes
63427	United States	Ukraine	M-88A2	armoured recovery vehicle	Armoured vehicles	2023	No	8	No	2023	No
67047	United States	Ukraine	AIM-9M	short-range air-to-air missile	Missiles	2023	No	600	Yes	2023	No
66336	United States	Ukraine	I-HAWK SAMS	SAM system	Air-defence systems	2023	No	3	Yes	2023	No
66337	United States	Ukraine	GBU-39 SDB	guided glide bomb	Missiles	2024	Yes	250	Yes	2024	
38809	United States	Ukraine	Penguin UAV	UAV	Aircraft	2023	No	5	Yes	2023	Yes
66523	United States	Ukraine	M-ATV	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2023	No	55	Yes	2023	No
65952	United States	Ukraine	GMLRS	guided rocket	Missiles	2022	No	1200	Yes	2024	Yes
65952	United States	Ukraine	GMLRS	guided rocket	Missiles	2022	No	1200	Yes	2023	Yes
65977	United States	Ukraine	MIM-23B	SAM	Missiles	2022	No	300	Yes	2024	
65977	United States	Ukraine	MIM-23B	SAM	Missiles	2022	No	100	Yes	2022	Yes
67011	United States	Ukraine	ATACMS-1	surface-to-surface missile	Missiles	2023	No	20	Yes	2023	No
67011	United States	Ukraine	ATACMS-1	surface-to-surface missile	Missiles	2023	No	30	Yes	2024	
66359	United States	Ukraine	M-2A3 Bradley	infantry fighting	Armoured vehicles	2023	No	4	No	2023	No



				vehicle							
66014	United States	Ukraine	M-1117 Guardian	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	236		2023	
66014	United States	Ukraine	M-1117 Guardian	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	164	Yes	2024	
66461	United States	Ukraine	FGM-148 Javelin	anti-tank missile	Missiles	2023	No	100	Yes	2024	
66461	United States	Ukraine	FGM-148 Javelin	anti-tank missile	Missiles	2023	No	100	Yes	2023	
67177	United States	Ukraine	M-1150 ABV	armoured engineer vehicle	Armoured vehicles	2023	No	1	Yes	2023	No
65837	United States	Ukraine	AIM-120C AMRAAM	long-range air-to-air missile	Missiles	2022	No	400	Yes	2024	
65837	United States	Ukraine	AIM-120C AMRAAM	long-range air-to-air missile	Missiles	2022	No	250	Yes	2023	No
65902	United States	Ukraine	MMR	multi-role radar	Sensors	2022	No	20	Yes	2023	Yes
65902	United States	Ukraine	MMR	multi-role radar	Sensors	2022	No	31	Yes	2024	
66217	United States	Ukraine	MaxxPro	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	1000	Yes	2024	No
66217	United States	Ukraine	MaxxPro	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	234	Yes	2023	No
66218	United States	Ukraine	M-992 FAASV	armoured supply vehicle	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	30	Yes	2023	No
66180	United States	Ukraine	Patriot-3 SAMS	SAM system	Air-defence systems	2022	No	2		2024	
66180	United States	Ukraine	Patriot-3 SAMS	SAM system	Air-defence systems	2022	No	1	No	2023	No
66178	United States	Ukraine	Cougar MRAP	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	37	No	2022	Yes
65786	United States	Ukraine	AGM-88 HARM	anti-radar missile	Missiles	2022	No	30	Yes	2024	
65786	United States	Ukraine	AGM-88 HARM	anti-radar missile	Missiles	2022	No	50	Yes	2023	No
65786	United States	Ukraine	AGM-88 HARM	anti-radar missile	Missiles	2022	No	60	Yes	2022	No
65821	United States	Ukraine	TOW-2B	anti-tank missile	Missiles	2022	No	9000	Yes	2024	
65821	United States	Ukraine	TOW-2B	anti-tank missile	Missiles	2022	No	9000	Yes	2023	No
65821	United States	Ukraine	TOW-2B	anti-tank missile	Missiles	2022	No	1500	No	2022	No
66460	United States	Ukraine	MIM-104 PAC-2	SAM	Missiles	2023	No	125	Yes	2024	No
66460	United States	Ukraine	MIM-104 PAC-2	SAM	Missiles	2023	No	200	Yes	2023	No
67491	United States	Ukraine	MPQ-64 Sentinel	air-search radar	Sensors	2022	No	1		2024	
66215	United States	Ukraine	M-2A3 Bradley	infantry fighting vehicle	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	220	Yes	2024	
66215	United States	Ukraine	M-2A3 Bradley	infantry fighting vehicle	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	105	Yes	2023	No
65201	United States	Ukraine	FGM-148 Javelin	anti-tank missile	Missiles	2021	No	300	Yes	2022	No
65074	United States	Ukraine	Mi-17	transport	Aircraft	2022	Yes	16	No	2022	No



	States			helicopter							
65074	United States	Ukraine	Mi-17	transport helicopter	Aircraft	2022	Yes	4	No	2023	No
65246	United States	Ukraine	Stinger	portable SAM	Missiles	2022	No	1200	Yes	2024	
65246	United States	Ukraine	Stinger	portable SAM	Missiles	2022	No	600	Yes	2023	No
65246	United States	Ukraine	Stinger	portable SAM	Missiles	2022	No	1450	Yes	2022	No
65396	United States	Ukraine	TPQ-36	artillery locating radar	Sensors	2022	No	19	Yes	2022	No
65552	United States	Ukraine	M-109A6 155mm	self-propelled gun	Artillery	2022	No	18	No	2023	No
66482	United States	Ukraine	UFH 155mm	towed gun	Artillery	2023	No	16	Yes	2024	
66482	United States	Ukraine	UFH 155mm	towed gun	Artillery	2023	No	25	No	2023	No
66280	United States	Ukraine	M-1A1 Abrams	tank	Armoured vehicles	2022	Yes	31	No	2023	No
66319	United States	Ukraine	S-70A Black Hawk	transport helicopter	Aircraft	2023	Yes	1	Yes	2023	No
66638	United States	Ukraine	BATT	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	20	Yes	2022	No
66638	United States	Ukraine	BATT	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	No	80	Yes	2023	No
65379	United States	Ukraine	APKWS	air-to-surface missile	Missiles	2022	No	700	Yes	2024	Yes
65379	United States	Ukraine	APKWS	air-to-surface missile	Missiles	2022	No	300	Yes	2023	No
65390	United States	Ukraine	UFH 155mm	towed gun	Artillery	2022	No	142	No	2022	No
65397	United States	Ukraine	MPQ-64 Sentinel	air-search radar	Sensors	2022	No	4	No	2022	No
66863	United States	Ukraine	MIM-104 PAC-3	ABM missile	Missiles	2023	No	250	Yes	2024	Yes
66863	United States	Ukraine	MIM-104 PAC-3	ABM missile	Missiles	2023	No	400	Yes	2023	No
66864	United States	Ukraine	MIM-104 PAC-3 MSE	ABM missile	Missiles	2024	No	120	Yes	2024	
66246	United States	Ukraine	LAV-3	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	Yes	212	Yes	2024	No
66246	United States	Ukraine	LAV-3	armoured personnel carrier	Armoured vehicles	2022	Yes	189	No	2023	No
66040	United States	Ukraine	Avenger AD	mobile SAM system	Air-defence systems	2022	No	12	No	2023	No
65635	United States	Ukraine	vehicle engine 301-400	vehicle engine	Engines	2022	No	11	No	2022	No
65562	United States	Ukraine	GMLRS	guided rocket	Missiles	2022	No	12500	Yes	2023	No
65562	United States	Ukraine	GMLRS	guided rocket	Missiles	2022	No	7000	Yes	2022	No
65562	United States	Ukraine	GMLRS	guided rocket	Missiles	2022	No	11000	Yes	2024	
65819	United States	Ukraine	ScanEagle	UAV	Aircraft	2022	No	30	Yes	2022	No
65818	United States	Ukraine	L-118 105mm	towed gun	Artillery	2022	No	36	No	2022	No
65818	United States	Ukraine	L-118	towed gun	Artillery	2022	No	36	No	2023	No



	States		105mm								
65376	United States	Ukraine	Switchblade-600	loitering munition	Missiles	2022	No	400	Yes	2024	
65376	United States	Ukraine	Switchblade-600	loitering munition	Missiles	2022	No	200	Yes	2023	No
65838	United States	Ukraine	TPQ-53	artillery locating radar	Sensors	2022	No	12	Yes	2023	No
65838	United States	Ukraine	TPQ-53	artillery locating radar	Sensors	2022	No	12	Yes	2024	Yes
68107	United States	Ukraine	GLSDB	surface-to-surface missile	Missiles	2023		100	Yes	2024	

**Source : SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, 2025 , Website:**

**<https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/TransferRegister>**

The above table illustrates that the United States of America has supplied the Phoenix Ghost Disruptor missiles, HMMWV-UA armoured vehicles, MMR Sensors, HIMARS artillery, vehicle engines 301-400, Avenger AD air defence systems, and Aircraft Air Defence systems.

**Table 2: Transfer of Arms from the USA to Ukraine from 2022 to 2024**

Recipient	2022	2023	2024	2022-2024	Percentage	Sum total years	Percentage of total	
Ukraine	872	1849	2906	5627	14%	5627	14%	
Total exports from United States	15351	11102	13512	39966	100%	39966		

**Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (c) SIPRI. Figures are in millions of SIPRI trend-indicator values (TIVs).**

**Website: <https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/TransferRegister>.**

The table above illustrates that the United States transferred arms worth US\$872 million to Ukraine in 2022. Since Russia has increased its offensive attacks on Russia, Ukraine has imported more weapons from the USA in 2024. Ukraine has imported weapons worth US\$1,849. The Russia-Ukraine war continued further. It has led Ukraine to import military equipment worth US\$2,906 in 2024. It has been calculated that the USA has exported military equipment worth US\$5,627 million. It has been 14% of the exports of military equipment that went to Ukraine alone from 2022 to 2024.

### **NATO's Revitalisation and Security Realignment in Europe**

The significant outcome of the Russia–Ukraine conflict was the resurgence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) of the West. It was initially criticised, but later emerged as one of the most important military alliances. NATO has further increased its significance by deploying advanced military equipment, maintaining effective military preparedness, and mobilising resources for its budget (NATO, 2022). These developments have forced Sweden and Finland to apply for NATO membership. Finland officially joined NATO in 2023. It is one of the significant developments of



NATO. It has strengthened the northern flank of NATO and also projected the alternative perspective of European security (Smith, 2023). It has prompted Romania, the Baltic countries, and Poland to modernise their military equipment, and these countries have been allocated a significant budget for defence spending. It has marked a new development in the geopolitics of Eastern Europe.

**Table 3: Volume of imports of major arms by the top 10 largest recipients, 2022-2024**

Rank 2022-2024	Recipient	2022	2023	2024	2022-2024	Share of global arms imports		
1	Ukraine	2930	4291	5230	12451	13%		
2	Qatar	3373	2000	1152	6525	7.10%		
3	Saudi Arabia	3058	1296	1111	5465	5.90%		
4	India	2629	1491	1168	5288	5.70%		
5	Pakistan	1540	2393	982	4915	5.30%		
6	Japan	1571	957	977	3506	3.80%		
7	Kuwait	2245	497	503	3245	3.50%		
8	Poland	409	1334	1448	3191	3.50%		
9	United States	733	792	1209	2735	3.00%		
10	UAE	714	948	932	2594	2.80%		
	Others	14670	13682	14226	42577	46%		
	Total	33871	29683	28938	92491	100%		

**Source:** SIPRI Arms Transfer Database,2025. Figures are in millions of SIPRI trend-indicator values (TIVs). Website: <https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/ImportExportTop>

The above table indicates that Ukraine has emerged as one of the top arms importers from 2022 to 2024. Ukraine has imported major arms from global countries worth US\$2930 million in 2022. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has forced Ukraine to further import weapons worth US\$4291 million from other countries. Similarly, Ukraine has imported arms worth 5230 million in 2024. Ukraine has imported major arms from global countries worth US\$12,451 million between 2022 and 2024. Overall, Ukraine has imported 13% of the global arms from 2022 to 2024 from various countries. It indicates Ukraine’s allocation of its defence budget in the wake of the conflict with Russia since 2022. India has imported arms worth US\$5.288 billion from 2022 to 2024. India’s share of global arms imports is 5,70%. Similarly, Pakistan has also imported military equipment worth US\$4.915 billion from 2022 to 2024. Pakistan’s share of global arms imports is 5.30%. Subsequently, Poland has imported weapons worth \$3,191 million from 2022 to 2024. Poland's share of global arms imports is 3.50%. Japan has imported weapons worth US \$3,506 million, and its share of global arms imports is



3.80% from 2022 to 2024. These trends are evident in the contemporary arms race within the multipolar world order.

### Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability

The global arms race and the revival of nuclear weapons strategies have posed a serious challenge to contemporary global security. Russia has used many nuclear threats when Ukraine targeted the military bases of Russia. Vladimir Putin also used nuclear arsenals as a weapon to minimise the strategies of NATO’s interference in the Russia-Ukraine war (Kroenig, 2022). These developments have created a considerable debate on strategic stability and nuclear deterrence in the global world. It has affected global arms control strategies. Eventually, Russia suspended its participation in the New START Treaty in 2023. A nuclear threat looms in the contemporary global order. Iran and North Korea have supported the nuclear strategies of Russia to stop external intervention and protect their strategic autonomy.

**Table 4: Exports of Major Arms by the top 10 largest suppliers from 2022 to 2024.**

	Rank 2022-2024	Supplier	2022	2023	2024	2022-2024	Share of global arms imports		
	<b>1</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>15351</b>	<b>11102</b>	<b>13512</b>	<b>39966</b>	<b>43%</b>		
	<b>2</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>3123</b>	<b>2150</b>	<b>2272</b>	<b>7545</b>	<b>8.20%</b>		
	<b>3</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>2280</b>	<b>2982</b>	<b>1131</b>	<b>6392</b>	<b>6.90%</b>		
	4	Germany	1489	2472	2049	6009	6.50%		
	<b>5</b>	<b>Russia</b>	<b>2510</b>	<b>1329</b>	<b>1339</b>	<b>5177</b>	<b>5.60%</b>		
	6	Italy	1711	1364	1379	4454	4.80%		
	7	United Kingdom	1711	1320	756	3788	4.10%		
	8	Israel	1050	1281	1026	3357	3.60%		
	9	Spain	1018	921	639	2578	2.80%		
	<b>10</b>	<b>South Korea</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>631</b>	<b>964</b>	<b>1815</b>	<b>2.00%</b>		
		Others	3409	4131	3870	11410	12%		
		Total	33871	29683	28938	92491	100%		

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database,2025, Website:  
<https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/ImportExportTop>

The table above illustrates that the United States has emerged as one of the top arms suppliers in the contemporary global world. The USA has exported weapons worth US\$15,351 million in 2022,



US\$11,102 million in 2023, and US\$13,512 million in 2024. The USA has supplied arms worth US\$39,966 million between 2022 and 2024. The USA has emerged as the top arms supplier, exporting 43% of global arms imports in the contemporary multipolar world order. Similarly, France has emerged as the second-largest arms supplier in the world, exporting defence equipment worth \$7,545 million from 2022 to 2024. France's share of global arms exports is 8.20%. In the wake of the Ukraine war, China has emerged as the third-largest arms supplier in the world. China has exported arms worth US\$6,392 between 2022 and 2024. China's share of global arms exports is 6.90%. Due to the Conflict with Ukraine, Russia has diverted its export weapons to the ongoing military conflict with Ukraine. Prior to 2022, Russia was the world's second-largest arms supplier.

Conflict with Ukraine has pushed Russia to the fifth position in global arms exports. Russia has exported military equipment worth US\$5,177 between 2022 and 2024. Russia's share of Global arms exports is 5.60%. Due to the Ukraine war, Russia's global arms exports have been drastically affected, further impacting the Russian economy. South Korea has emerged as the tenth-largest arms supplier in the world. Between 2022 and 2024, South Korea exported weapons worth US\$1,815, and its global arms share is 2.0%. These developments have indicated that the Russia-Ukraine war has forced countries in Asia and Africa to allocate more budget to the defence sector.

### **Long-Term Strategic Consequences**

The Russia-Ukraine war has led to long-term consequences for the contemporary global world. It has resulted in divisions in global politics and security. The Russia-Ukraine war has resulted in the strengthening of NATO, supported by the US and Western countries, and other blocs led by Russia and China. It has posed many questions and challenges to globalisation and global security. The emergence of the Russia-Ukraine war has raised serious concerns and challenges for the contemporary global world. It has also challenged the legitimacy of the liberal international order.

### **Impact on Global Energy Security**

The Russia-Ukraine war has altered the global energy security landscape, with a particular focus on Europe. Before the launch of the war, Russia supplied 40% of Europe's natural gas. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to global sanctions on Russia and the diversification of energy sources. Subsequently, Germany has pushed forward with the Nord Stream project, and EU nations have substantially reduced their dependence on Russian gas through LNG imports from the U.S., Qatar, and Norway (IEA, 2023). It has led to global consequences. On the one hand, it has led to energy insecurity and volatility of oil prices at the global level. On the other hand, it has prompted trends towards the transition to renewable energy in Europe. Furthermore, it has created social unrest, inflation, and high crude oil prices in Asia and Africa. It has indicated the weaponisation of energy. Gas Cutoffs have been used as a geopolitical tool by Russia. Western countries have heavily imposed financial sanctions on Russia and placed price caps on Russia's oil exports. It has created new contours in modern geopolitics.

### **Food Security and the Global South**

The Russia-Ukraine war has had a significant impact on global food security. Russia and Ukraine were significant exporters of fertilisers, wheat, and corn. The disturbance in the supply chains has led to a hike in the oil prices in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The Russia-Ukraine war also blocked the Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea (FAO, 2023). The United Nations and Turkey have mediated the Black Sea Grain initiative, resulting in the restoration of some grain exports. The suspension of grain exports in mid-2023 has created a high level of insecurity in the global food chain



supply. Furthermore, it has enabled countries to develop indigenous methods for achieving self-sufficiency in agriculture and independent supply chains at the international level.

### **Refugees and Human Security**

The Russia-Ukraine war has created a prolonged refugee crisis in Europe since World War II. Due to this war, 8 million Ukrainian citizens have been displaced (UNHCR, 2024). The refugee has led to the designing of the migration places, fractured social solidarity and inadequate resources. Further, the Russia-Ukraine war has developed the connection between human security and armed conflict. Refugees have faced various issues related to education, employment, healthcare and shelter. Civil Society and humanitarian organisations have played a vital role in extending help to displaced refugees.

### **Cybersecurity and Hybrid Warfare**

The Russia-Ukraine war has become an epicentre for hybrid warfare, employing both conventional and modern warfare methods. It has included disinformation tactics, cyberattacks, and economic sabotage methods. Russia has launched cyber operations and heavily targeted the critical infrastructure of Russia, military communication networks and Government systems. Russia had disabled the Viasat satellite internet before the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Russia has targeted Ukraine's power grids (Zetter, 2022). It has far-reaching implications for contemporary global security. European Countries and the USA have extended their support to Ukraine for the cyber air defence system. It has sent a strong message that future wars will be fought in both virtual and physical domains. Microsoft and SpaceX also played a vital role in the Russia-Ukraine war, creating a network that bridges national security and non-state actors. These developments indicate that technological sovereignty and cyber resilience will be central to global security in the contemporary world order.

### **China's Strategic Calculus and Indo-Pacific Security**

The Russia-Ukraine war has implications for the Indo-Pacific security with special reference to China's approach to Taiwan. Global sanctions, Russia's military failures, and the unity of Eastern countries have posed serious challenges to global security (Cheng, 2023). Furthermore, the Russia-Ukraine war has also fostered interaction and coordination among the QUAD countries. USA, India, Australia and Japan are the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The United States of America saw the Taiwan crisis through the lens of Ukraine. The Taiwan crisis and the Ukraine crisis have sent a strong message to the contemporary multipolar world order. China have extended its diplomatic, political and economic support to Russia in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war and global financial sanctions on Russia. These developments have led to the emergence of new Cold War politics between authoritarian and democratic states.

### **Conclusion**

The Russia-Ukraine war began in February 2022 and has significantly impacted the global security and resilience of the contemporary international order. Ukraine's political system and its citizens have suffered greatly. Russia has shown its military prowess. The Russia-Ukraine war has revitalised the strategic policies of NATO and the defence commitments of Europe. Finland and Sweden joined NATO. NATO has increased its military capabilities and deployment, and revised guidelines for implementing the ethos of collective security. Western countries have supplied Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to European countries and mobilised their strategic stockpiles. Food export disruptions have exposed the vulnerabilities.



Significant changes have occurred, including the emergence of a multipolar world order. Strategic and ideological divides have become even deeper. The “Axis of Upheaval” between Russia and China has been materialised in the wake of Western countries' sanctions. China has emerged as a strong player in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine crisis. China has extended diplomatic, political and economic cooperation to Russia. China plays a vital role in coordinating military and trade efforts. It has emerged as a cautious partner by striking a balance between economic leverage and global reputation. The Russia-Ukraine war has transformed the nature of the global order from the American-led Unipolar world order to the multipolar world order. Regional organisations and various multilateral institutions have played a predominant role in shaping the global political system's outlook.

Hybrid warfare methods have emerged as a prominent one in the Russia-Ukraine war. It includes sabotage methods, cyberattacks, elite-led campaigns, and disinformation tactics across Europe. Russia has extensively used “new generation warfare” tactics on the Ukrainian military. It has immensely helped Russia to gain success on various fronts. Hybrid warfare methods have exposed the lacunae in Ukraine's infrastructure and strongly advocated for resilience in the communication networks, energy, and cyber domains.

Global institutions, i.e. the United Nations, have come under tremendous pressure and criticism in the aftermath of the Russia–Ukraine war. The Security Council of the United Nations has been paralysed. The European Union and NATO have strongly advocated reforms in military strategic capabilities, military deployment, and the allocation of funds for the defence sector. Despite these developments, Gulf States, India and Turkey have continued their neutral stance in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war. BRICS has been playing a vital role in the contemporary world order. Russia has strongly supported a multipolar world based on international law, global norms and a just world order. Since the Western countries have imposed economic sanctions on Russia, Russia has also had an opportunity for dollarisation. Most of the BRICS countries have also supported the idea of de-dollarisation in the wake of Donald Trump’s trade sanctions on the BRICS countries. BRICS countries have been exploring various alternative financial channels. Ukrainian President Zelensky has received military aid from Western countries and NATO. China has been playing an effective role in conflict management and long-term deterrence.

The Russia–Ukraine war has changed the nature of global security. It has led to Western defence solidarity and fragmentation in the multipolar world order. It has showcased various dimensions of warfare, i.e., informational, economic, and cyber. It has created strains in global institutions, motivated financial realignments, and forced the non-aligned powers to continue their strategic autonomy. Since the multipolar world order has been fragmented due to the Russia-Ukraine war, very pertinent challenges have emerged for global political leadership to continue equitable diplomacy and maintain institutional resilience. Calibrated engagement will bring dynamic changes to the global security framework of the contemporary multipolar world order.

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